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Nation and National Identity as a Boundary: 
English, British and the European Union1 
 




Fredrik Barth’s (1969) essay on ‘ethnic groups and boundaries’ has been taken to signal a 
marked and more or less permanent shift in the sociology or anthropology of  ethnicity. 
This has been to question the conceptualisation of  ethnic groups as fixed – or corporate 
– entities, whose distinctiveness can be described by a complex of  cultural difference. The 
shift is towards a ‘transactional’ model of  ethnicity based on the use of  ‘names’ (for 
peoples) and the transaction across boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Richard Jenkins 
(2008) has summarized the argument: 
 
… Barth’s critique of  the traditional model … starts from the definition of  the 
situation held by social actors … and the focus of  attention becomes the 
maintenance of  ethnic boundaries in the interaction between ‘us and them’ that 
takes place across the boundary … (2008: 19). 
 
Ethnic ‘groups’ are to be found in the naming or classifications that people make between 
themselves and others, and the deployment of  these named boundaries in all manner of  
social actions. Now this says next to nothing about the distinctiveness of  ethnicity as the 
boundary marker. The distinctiveness of  ethnicity could be argued to be its association 
with ancestry, or ideas of  shared destiny, and ideas of  superiority and inferiority which so 
often mark inter-ethnic relations. People make, for example, status distinctions between 
themselves and others and certainly act in order to preserve the status boundaries. Jenkins 
(2008: 43) makes a similar point when he raises the question of  what might be the 
difference between types of  identity – regional, communal, ethnic. His answer is that 
difference lies in the consequences of  each ‘in terms of  rights and responsibilities, or 
access to social and economic resources, or social recognition’ (2008: 43). If  then the 
model of  ‘identity’ and ‘boundary transactions’ can be applied to a wide range of  forms 
of  social identification (albeit with different social consequences) then what can we say 
about the us-them marker which conceptually has been so close to ethnicity – the nation? 
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Given that we have a general model – of  identities and boundary transactions – then there 
is nothing in principle to prevent the model being applied to a wide range of  non-ethnic 
identities. Certainly this seems to be the view taken by Brubaker et al. (2004): ‘Although 
Barth formulated his argument with respect to ethnicity, it applies, mutatis mutandis, to race 
and nation as well’ (2004: 32). This is a consequence of  the shift from ‘objectivism’ (i.e. 
the defining of  nation, race, ethnic group by their objective characteristics) to an emphasis 
on subjective identifications (i.e. the actor’s understanding of  her/his affiliation, alignment, 
‘membership’). But Jenkins is absolutely right to point out that the ‘social consequences’ 
of  identities differ according to their context in a system of  obligations and resources. 
This is compellingly so in the case of  the nation. We know that there are nations without 
states, self-proclaimed nations which seek statehood; and that there are multi-national 
states, and states with a dominant ‘civic’ identity. The ‘fit’ between nation and state takes 
many forms and each case has its specific history which tells the story of  nationhood and 
becoming a state. But in the contemporary world at least, the central characteristics of  
nationhood and national identity are to be found in their intimate connection – actual or 
aspiring or past – with statehood. 
 
And this is not something which is wholly dependent on the actor’s definition of  the 
situation. Given that our nationality connects us to a state and citizenship, it is no minor 
thing to claim to be French or to be German or to be Taiwanese. Identities of  this kind 
connect to very important historical and political institutions and the national or 
nationalist ideas associated with these histories. Not only is this objectively true – the 
connections between nations, states, and citizenship have formal and legal foundations – 
but its significance is also recognised by actors. When people talk about ‘their country’, 
they explicitly or tacitly recognise that the nation-state is the most important social 
container in which they are implicated. In multi-national states they may refer to the ‘sub-
state’ nation. 
 
In the second half  of  the paper we shall be examining the views of  and dispositions 
towards the nation expressed by non-elite interviewees in a study of  ‘class resentment and 
national identity’ carried out between 2004 and 2009 (Mann and Fenton, 2017). We have 
returned to this data partly because it offers a good source of  material on peoples’ 
comments on British membership of  the European Union (EU), some several years 
before the 2016 referendum on British membership; and partly because when people talk 
about the EU and related topics, they reveal significant aspects of  their view of  the nation 
as boundary. We have argued elsewhere that the views expressed by (some of  the) 
interviewees in our study constitute a kind of  ‘resentful nationalism’, typically among 
people who feel that their voice has not been heard and their interests ignored (Fenton 
2012). We re-visit some of  that material especially in the light of  the 2016 EU referendum 
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in the UK. This is a crucial topic for two particular reasons. First the question of  
sovereignty (and the EU) became a key issue in the referendum debates, the very issue 
which Wellings (2010) identified as an important element of  an ‘English nationalism’. 
Secondly the kinds of  statements made by our interviewees on the ‘EU question’ conveyed 
national and sometimes resentful messages about ‘Brussels’ and ‘control’, a central theme 
of  the referendum campaigns. The expressed views of  our interviewees on ‘our country’ 
and the ‘European Union’ – as well as a range of  closely related questions including 
immigration, history and the Second World War, globalization – form a kind of  ‘popular 
orientation to the nation’ and even in some cases a ‘popular nationalism’. In the EU 
referendum campaign, political leaders – and especially the Leave campaigns – sought to 
connect with the public’s views of  the nation and the EU (Shipman, 2017: 414 ff.). What 
became crucial was the ‘resonance’ between campaign messages and a range of  popular 
attitudes, particularly about immigration and sovereignty (control). 
 
In what follows we will begin by taking account of  the debates about elite and non-elite 
nationhood or nationalism. This is not a rehearsal of  ‘theories of  nationalism’ or of  the 
debates about ‘everyday nationalism’ but an attempt to direct our attention to some key 
points which bear upon our principal arguments and analysis in this paper. We then look 
at some further examples of  how the nation enters everyday life and everyday conversation, 
drawing in particular on Gullestad’s (1997) account of  boundaries, everyday life and 
Norwegian national identity. Following this, we provide our empirical analysis of  the 
interview data. 
 
Elite and non-elite views of  the nation 
 
The view that elites – of  various kinds – have played a key part in promoting national and 
nationalist ideas, parties and movements, is well established (for a critique see Whitmeyer 
2002). And the fact that these ideas and movements must appeal to someone – that is, a 
general public or a section of  it - is unremarkable; otherwise elite nationalists would be 
talking among themselves. This means that there is always a question of  ‘resonance’  
between the promoters of  a message and the intended audience (Bonikowski 2017). Most 
typically the nation by its very nature is a broad and inclusive appeal. In practice the appeal 
may be directed to a particular class or classes, or at least there are classes where the 
national message finds a ready home. The emphasis on everyday nationalism or everyday 
conceptions of  nationhood constitutes an attempt to highlight the popular or ordinary 
views of  the nation, in contrast to the focus on elite promoters of  national and nationalist 
messages. Although the literature on elite and ordinary views of  the nation prompted a 
debate about the proper approach (see the Fox, Miller-Idriss 2008 and Smith 2008 
exchanges), there is, in our view, no necessary antagonism between the approaches 
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advocated. The advocates of  the everyday nationhood approach are making an entirely 
proper plea for an understanding of  the sentiments, attitudes and views of  the world of  
those to whom national or nationalist messages may be directed. The critics are making 
the case that if  the everyday approach neglects historical and causal models in the rise and 
fall of  nationalisms, then it risks becoming trivial. 
 
But there is nothing essential in these kinds of  oppositions, or indeed in several other 
oppositions that appeared in the Fox, Miller-Idriss and Smith debate. Clearly a focus on 
elites needs to extend to those with whom the message is intended to resonate; clearly the 
‘everyday’ non-elite model must be made to fit the broader models of  historical 
explanation. And, as Smith has argued, we should be examining not only elite and non-
elite nationalism but the relationship between them. Smith has suggested that an apparent 
divide between the two approaches risks neglecting ‘interaction between elites and “the 
people”, or among groups of  non-elites, and between them and the elites’ (2008: 565). As 
early as 2002, Whitmeyer was making the case that élite models of  the origins of  
nationalism are never sufficient, and he did this by demonstrating two simple points: one, 
that elite promoters of  a nationalist message may fail because they are not taken up by the 
class or classes of  ‘ordinary people’ to whom they are directed; two, that national and 
nationalist ideas may themselves have a primary origin among non-elites. In his words, ‘my 
approach here is to question the thesis that elites create popular nationalism by presenting 
a large number of  negative cases, cases in which some elites advocate a nationalism that 
fails to become popular’ (Whitmeyer, 2002: 325). 
 
If  all of  this makes the case for taking seriously non-elite views of  the nation, there remain 
some critical comments that should be noted. Smith, for example, is right to suggest that 
the phrase ‘ordinary people’ – or indeed everyday nationalism – introduces a concept 
which is insufficiently specified. The non-elites cannot be summarised by the word 
‘ordinary people’; we know very well that their views vary, for example, by class, region 
and age; there seems little doubt that a mode of  nationalism expressed in the ‘Leave’ vote 
in the United Kingdom EU referendum of  2016 was closely related to age groups of  
voters. It is also possible – as Smith argues – that a concentration on the everyday is to 
take a non-historical view; a simple fascination with how people talk about the nation. But 
again, this is by no means a necessary failing: clearly some parts of  what people say about 
the nation are themselves historical statements with references – not always fully coherent 
– to, for example, ‘past glories’ of  Britain which have been lost and should be retrieved. It 
is entirely possible to make the connections between a historical account of  the nation 
and nationalism, and the accounts which people give when they talk about their country. 
The stories that people tell and the images on which they draw reveal their own 
biographical histories and memories. In the United Kingdom people in their seventies 
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remember the immediate post-war period, Suez and winds of  change in Africa; rather 
younger people will remember the Vietnam War, Enoch Powell, Mrs. Thatcher, The 
Falklands War, the poll tax, Blair and the Iraq War, and now the EU referendum. This is 
without considering what they have learned from books, films or schooling – like being 
shown maps of  the world with British Empire areas coloured in red. Older peoples’ 
memories of  the Second World War and the decade after it may have given (some of) them 
a view of  Britain which augmented their sceptical view of  the EU (Osborne 2017, 
Wintour 2018). 
 
There remains one other issue which ought to be clarified. The title of  the paper by Fox-
Miller is ‘Everyday Nationhood’. It is not, we should be clear ‘Everyday Nationalism’. 
Researchers who have spent time looking at grounded views of  the nation in the 
statements of  their research subjects, know very well that not all talk about the nation 
amounts to nationalism. For one thing people often talk (in conversational interviews) in 
contradictory ways and in ways which are not easy to classify or categorise. Much of  what 
they say scarcely amounts to an orderly, elaborated and distinct nationalist view of  the 
world. But their talk does nonetheless have important implications for how they 
understand the nation as well as giving clues to when and how their views of  the world 
could be converted into something close to nationalism. To be sure, as people talk about 
‘this country’ or ‘our country’ they are recognising the important extent to which their 
lives are grounded in a nation-state. And this partly explains why they become elated or 
angry about their nation; they know that the way that ‘the country goes’ bears down on 
their lives. We can see what people say as containing fragments – of  ideas, attitudes, or 
national history. They may speak of  Britain ‘standing alone’, or of  people who ‘work hard 
and deserve what they get’ or of  ‘our country going soft or becoming a soft touch’. These 
are the very fragments which political leaders, scrupulously or not, may recognise and 
deploy in their own statements.  
 
The ‘nation’ in the actor’s social imagination 
 
Barth clearly conceived of  social action at the boundaries between ethnic categories or 
groups as including face-to-face interactions, where people both deploy categories of  ‘us 
and them’ and reinforce them through differential behaviour, for example in the extending 
of  hospitality and social exchanges. It may be thought that the nation represents a ‘step-
up’ in the abstractness of  the social category. Of  course, in international exchanges and 
politics, this is the case; the ‘other’ is another nation-state. There are however several 
important contexts where the national boundary plays a key part in face-to-face social 




Minorities by national origin 
 
In all immigrant-receiving countries we can find first-generation populations whose 
country-of-origin identity has the potential to be a social marker. Classic community 
studies in American sociology, like Herbert Gans’ Urban Villagers (1962) told the story of  
immigrants whose country of  origin formed a basis of  residential and community social 
life, influenced by shared language. The identities given by the ‘host’ community may not 
match their own classifications; thus in the United Kingdom, immigrants in the 1950s who 
thought of  themselves as Trinidadian, Barbadian, or Jamaican, were often referred to as 
West Indian or simply (in the language of  the time) ‘coloured’ (i.e.  a ‘racialized boundary’, 
Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992). In his account of  Hungarian minorities in Romania, Fox 
has shown how national origin can, for some individuals, be hidden or non-salient, 
especially if  the person speaks fluent and unaccented Romanian (Fox 2008: 540). For 
others with marked accents or language difference, foreign nationality prompts a national 
orientation among the immigrants themselves, and in the native population who by 
marking the immigrants as ‘foreign’ mark themselves as the ‘people of  this country’. 
Insofar as national boundaries are maintained in the interaction between ‘us and them’, 
then there is also the question of  how the boundary persists for descendants of  migrants. 
Second and third generation immigrants may have the feeling that they are not classed as 
full members of  the nation, despite being native-born and adopting the national identity 
(Jacobson 1997). In some European countries, native-born descendants of  immigrants 
will continue to be categorized, both officially and in the popular imagination, as 




National identity has the potential to become a marker in social interaction in all multi-
national states, where sub-state national identities (Catalan in Spain, Welsh in the United 
Kingdom) are socially visible through accent, language, and patterns of  settlement. The 
English are, for example, the largest national origin minority in Scotland and are socially 
recognised by accent. Relations between ‘native’ Scottish and in-migrant English can 
hardly fail to be influenced by the overall position of  England as the dominant political 
and economic power in the United Kingdom (see McIntosh, Sim and Robertson 2004). 
 
But even in those social contexts where foreign nationals, or sub-state national identities, 
have the potential for prompting national significance in social cognition and social 
exchanges, it is very frequently the ‘majoritarian’ definition of  the national boundary which acts 
as a catalyst in these cases.  At the local level we would see face to face interaction of  
foreign nationals and the national majority; but there is a near-constant majoritarian 
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imagining of  the presence of  immigrants. Both sovereignty (take back control) and 
immigration (control our borders) loomed large in the EU referendum debates. In the 
case of  sub-state nationhood, the dominant state (Britain-England) is a more or less 
constant point of  reference. 
 
Taken for granted nationhood; majoritarian nationhood 
 
Many researchers have described a taken-for-granted assumption of  national belonging 
(Edensor 2006, Bonikowski 2013, Gullestad 1997). This is not a case of  national identity 
being prompted by difference – as in the two examples above – but by ‘sameness’, a tacit 
recognition by the people of  a country of  ‘being in the same boat’. In the literature we 
can find a number of  themes and theses which seek to make some explanation of  this 
tacit national identity. There are some daily, or at least frequent, reminders of  nationhood 
which can be seen in the banal symbols and images of  everyday life – in the UK, the 
monarch’s image on coins, the flags flying from public buildings, and even the weather 
forecast with its repeated drawing of  the boundaries of  the nation-state. Smith (1991) has 
emphasized the historic story of  the nation, the reminders of  this history in public festivals 
and commemorations, and the grounding of  the national story in familiar landscapes. In 
the imagination of  a nation’s people, these reminders reinforce what Bonikowski (2013) 
has called ‘the taken for granted assumption that the nation state is a natural and primary 
object of  loyalty and identification, as well as a fundamental building block of  the modern 
institutional order’ (2013: 4). 
 
Other ways of  analysing this taken for granted nationhood follow a similar model. One is 
by locating a sense of  national attachment in the activities, rituals, and repetitions of  
everyday life; this we shall see above all in Gullestad’s account of  the national boundary 
in Norway. We should also acknowledge that in some real material ways – and not just 
symbolic –  people are in the ‘same boat’. They know for example that they are legally 
bound by the state’s tax measures and that political interventions in rates of  taxation affect 
them; people in Britain know that the success and failure of  British industries, commerce 
and banking have a direct impact on their lives. Of  course peoples’ responses to these 
changes in the national political economy are not the same – but they are about the same 
set of  problems. And they sense that the way these questions are handled are fateful for 
them. 
 
Norway, everyday practices, and boundaries: Marianne Gullestad 
 
The Norwegian anthropologist Marianne Gullestad has drawn on the concepts of  
boundaries, everyday life, and ‘plausibility structures’ in her account of  Norwegian 
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national identity. In Passion for Boundaries (1997) Gullestad argues that Norwegians’ sense 
of  nationhood is reinforced by the way symbols and practices associated with the nation 
are embedded in family and community life. And because children often take a central 
place in national celebrations and national imagery, she argues that Norway sees its 
nationalism as innocent and peaceful. 
 
For most people in Norway, national symbols, such as the flag and the national 
anthem, carry only positive popular connotations.... the Norwegian flag is 
associated with peace. (People recall) how they learned about the German 
capitulation (8 May 1945) through the sudden appearance of  Norwegian flags, 
virtually everywhere. This is something they will never forget (1997: 24). 
 
The flag does not just appear on national days, or at football matches, but also in the 
routine lives of  families: 
 
Many private houses in Norway have their own flagpoles. The flag is hoisted not 
only on official days, but also for family and neighbourhood celebrations, such as 
birthdays or life cycle rituals such as baptisms, confirmations, weddings and burials. 
(1997: 24) 
 
Because the flag and nationhood are grounded in everyday life, daily social exchanges have 
the effect of  reinforcing the sense of  national belonging; they provide the ‘plausibility 
structures of  nationhood’, repeated in conversations and mutual experiences: 
 
Everyday life practices constitute part of  what might be termed the ‘plausibility 
structures’ of  contemporary national identity, in the sense that such experiences 
provide part of  the experiential grounding of, as well as metaphoric resources for, 
what Benedict Anderson has termed the ‘imagining of  national communities’. (1997: 
21) 
 
Gullestad also claims that the idea of  ‘boundaries’ has a general meaning and applicability 
in Norwegian life, such that the idea of  the nation is grounded in an idea of  inside and 
outside, within the boundaries of  Norwegian life, and beyond it. Within Norwegian social 
life, certain things are highly valued: children and the family, the outdoor life, equality, and 
social justice among them. For many these values were threatened by joining the EU and 
would bring Norway ‘down to their level’ (1997: 26): 
 
In debates about the EU, national ‘independence’ is particularly central. What is at 
stake for opponents of  the EU is national independence, closely related to the 
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notion of  national self-determination. The Norwegian expression is sjølråderetten, 
‘the right to decide one’s own’. This notion invokes self-government, independence, 
sovereignty, the right to manage available resources within a specific geographic 
area (1997: 26). 
 
Norway faced the question of  entering the EU in 1994, when the option to stay outside 
won with 52% of  the vote. Gullestad drew on the debates about the EU to explain 
Norwegian national attitudes, and  as a case study of  the relationship between a national 
narrative and aspects of  everyday life among Norwegian people.  That is to say themes of  
the national story resonate with people in Norway because they fit plausibly with the way they 
live. Sturdy independence, enjoyment of  a sometimes tough outdoor life, a strong sense 
of  equality, and broadly accepted positive valuing of  the welfare state, are simultaneously 
national themes and dimensions of  the everyday business of  family life, work and leisure. 
Edensor has made a similar argument where he suggests that ‘small everyday arrangements 
merge the local with the national’ through repetition and familiarity. People are, he argues, 
in effect saying ‘this is how things are... this is how we do things’ (Edensor, 2006: 529). 
What he calls these ‘embodied habits’ have the effect of  constituting ‘national worlds of  
meaning and action’ including those routines which are connected to state regulation. 
These regularities in ‘our’ way of  doing things are the very ones we become aware of  when 
we travel to another country or observe different routines among foreign nationals in ‘our 
own’ country. In the next section of  our paper we look at how people, from discursive 
interviews, talk about everyday life, their expectations, their material concerns – and the 
EU – as modes of  revealing expressions of  nationhood. 
 
Popular views of  nation and Europe in England 
 
We now turn to the corpus of  approximately 140 qualitative interviews conducted 
between 2004 and 2009 in four research sites in the south of  England (for further details 
of  the methods, sample and data see Mann and Fenton 2017). The data, thus, was collected 
a decade ago; but includes topics and themes on Europe and the EU. The comments of  
our respondents do reflect older political topics prominent at the time of  interview – the 
Iraq war, Prime Minister Blair, and the Euro Currency - but we also see striking 
continuities between our respondent attitudes and current political views towards the EU. 
Since these interviews were completed, we have seen in the United Kingdom, the 2014 
Scottish Independence Referendum, the electoral successes of  the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) between 2014 and 2016, as well as the 2016 referendum on 
membership of  the EU. These political events have occasioned a politicisation of  English 
identity (Wyn Jones et al. 2012, Henderson et al 2017) and even, some argue, a kind of  
English nationalism (O’Toole 2016). Our qualitative data reveals that popular views of  
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nation and the EU have been long established in everyday views of  the world. The leave 
campaigns for the referendum on the EU, in 2016, successfully connected to these popular 
understandings and achieved a notable resonance with them. 
 
We try to organise the empirical material in a particular way, beginning with some explicit 
examples of  national boundary drawing, before considering the deployment of  
boundaries with reference to everyday, political and historical contexts and themes. Our 
interest is in the way actors themselves make discursive connections between nation and 
different everyday situations, and how references to everyday situations intersect with 
historical and political ideas of  the nation, and in their views of  the EU. 
 
Drawing boundaries and distinguishing nations 
 
It is not surprising that people’s talk about the nation should entail the invocation of  
boundaries between them and us, given their significance for the construction of  social 
identities (Jenkins 2008: 54-56). Close attention, however, reveals that people draw 
national boundaries in highly varied ways. In some instances, the invocation of  boundaries 
is quite explicitly in relation to other named countries –France or Germany are common 
in our own case, for example. These references to other countries are sometimes part of  
a conversation about defining ‘the English/British’ or ‘England/Britain’; in other cases, 
people’s will refer to other nations (French or German) in opposition to ‘we’ or ‘us’. These 
are both ways in which national boundary drawing most closely resembles boundary 
drawing between ethnic groups. But when interviewees speak about France and Germany, 
for example, they also make distinctions between English/England, Britain/British and 
Europe and the EU. The extracts below – firstly an interview with Margaret and Nigel, a 
married couple, and then with Dan and Nick - illustrate the significance of  the European 
context for English and British national distinction: 
 
B43: Margaret (Female, 50-59, Primary School Teacher) and Nigel (Male, 50-
59, Social Services Officer) 
Interviewer: You think that’s just something that’s different about Britain? 
Margaret: I think that’s definitely something that’s different about Britain. We are 
quite insular and people are quite narrow in their views as well. Which I don’t think 
is a particularly good thing! 
Nigel: Ye I don’t think we’ve got that kind of  European feeling. You get some 
countries whether on this or that side of  the border, Belgium or Holland or Germany 





B3: Dan (Male, 25-29, Graduate Engineer) 
I don’t think we should join the Euro. We should not rush into anything because 
Britain is so different to Europe. We’re unique, not just some part of  Europe. 
 
B35 Nick (Male, 70-79, Retired Factory Production Manager) 
It won’t surprise you to know that I’m not very keen on Europe (laughs). I’ve got a 
daughter-in-law who’s German. My son married and he’s out there. No I suppose 
I’m one of  the old ones. We’ve got that strip of  land er water between us and that’s 
served us well for years and years. I know it wouldn’t stop another war or anything 
like that but it still gives us that break, I just wish they had never dug that blasted 
tunnel. 
 
In these examples, the nation is distinguished by the drawing of  a boundary with other 
nations and Europe, and by a relatively strong rejection of  a European identity. There are 
references to English ‘insularity’ and narrow-ness compared to the perceived similarities 
between ‘Belgium, Holland or Germany or whatever’, whereby ‘we’ do not ‘mix’ to the 
same extent. These boundaries are not only imagined; they are materialised, and 
naturalised, through reference to Britain as an ‘island’, and to the physical border of  the 
English channel – boundaries which, according to Nick, are also disrupted by the material 
connections with mainland Europe (‘I wish they’d never dug that blasted tunnel’). These 
sorts of  distinctions between England and other nations, or between England and Europe, 
that we draw attention to here, are also evident in several of  the extracts below in which 
respondents express an anxiety about the loss of  national distinctiveness. 
 
Identity loss and boundary drawing 
 
The asserting of  national boundaries against ‘other’ entities operating at a supra-national 
scale (‘I am British…certainly not European’) points to a wider question concerning the 
consequences of  globalisation for national identity. There has, of  course, been much 
commentary about a so-called ‘identity crisis’, or insecurity over identity loss, as liberal 
democratic states become ever more inter-dependent within a global economic system. 
The following interviewees refer to explicitly to the loss of  a distinct identity and the 
importance of  national distinctions. 
 
B46: Kate (Female, 40-49, Manager of  Charitable Organisation) 
I always thought this idea of  not having our own money and our own identity that 
would implode eventually because we can’t cope. Those little details are so important 
if  you go abroad. It’s just so much more interesting, different money and different 
culture and different methods. Now we’re flattening everything out. It’s being eroded. 
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We’re being asked to see ourselves as European. To see yourself  melded with that 
huge variety of  people and things and attitudes. So I think being British helps. We 
were always terribly proud as children you know we went abroad a lot of  the time, 
Dad loved France, spoke it brilliantly. You always went there for holidays and it was 
quite rare in those days. If  you saw another British car you used to hoot and wave. 
If  you met another British family on the camp site. There was something about how 
we all come from the same place. 
 
W45: Jane (Female, 30-39, Police officer) 
I don’t think we should have a big Euro country. England is just fine as it is. I don’t 
see why we have to join another country. We we’re fine by ourselves throughout 
history and we are to this day now. We got enough people, not non-British. I don’t 
see why to say yes I want to. It would be really weird. Having loads of  different 
nationalities here. It would start to break down what it means to be English. 
 
B41: Vicky (Female, 25-29, Accountant) 
Interviewer: Okay, do you see yourself  as English, British or what? 
Definitely not European, I know that!  I’m definitely not European.  I consider 
myself  British more than anything else.  Certainly British.  Not English, I think 
British.  Certainly not European. 
Interviewer: So you mentioned European quite strongly. So why not European? 
I don’t know.  It’s just with work and what have you, and you’ve got everything’s 
turning international. Everything’s being standardised throughout the world. It’s nice 
to turn round and say ‘well you know, I’m British, this is where I was born and I’m 
proud of  it’. But in things like the single European monetary thing, that’s quite a hot 
topic. I’m quite aware with what’s going on with that. And I’m like ‘no, I’m not having 
it’. 
 
W31: Sue (Female, 50-59, Health Visitor) 
I don’t really know how I feel about Europe. I just wish that we weren’t all becoming 
sort of  lumped together as one Europe. I think it’s a shame, I expect we’ll lose our 
currency and I think that’s a shame because it’s part of  our individuality 
 
W42: Brian (Male, 50-59 Motor Mechanic) 
It’s a good up to a point. It’s a good to get all in one community. It helps everybody 
out. You can travel around easier. But we spread this EU too far out now I mean. It’s 
got so big. I can’t see it’s going out to Turkey and places like that. I got nothing 
against them but it’s spreading too far. We got our own community. We’re spreading 




With each respondent above, we see scepticism towards Europe and the EU. In such cases 
the idea of  Europe as a political project: ‘Being asked to be European’, ‘the Big Euro 
country’, ‘the single European monetary thing’) are perceived as a threat to national 
identity (‘it would start to break down what it means to be English’). At the same time, it 
is noticeable the extent to which our interviewees switch between English, British and 
Britain when expressing anxieties about the loss of  distinctiveness in boundaries. In three 
of  the cases currency, the pound, ‘having your own money’ get explicit mention as markers 
of  national distinctiveness. Thus we see concerns about the diluting of  national 
boundaries within a wider global environment (‘we’re flattening everything’, ‘everything’s 
being standardised’, ‘everything’s turning international’). For Kate at least, concern about 
the dilution of  boundaries is not, on the face of  it, inconsistent with his experience and 
valuing of  other European cultures and languages. At several points, respondents view 
this wider context in relation to actual transnational experiences, for example, reflections 
on experiences abroad, returning from holidaying in Europe especially: returning through 
customs, or on the ferry home, or camping in Europe with other Brits. 
 
Contexts of  national boundary drawing: everyday, historical, political 
 
As we argued earlier in the paper, people’s views and attitudes towards nation and country 
commonly rest on an intersection of  everyday, historical and political themes. In the first 
case here, we see how June makes a connection between nation and different everyday 
contexts and experiences: 
 
B21: June (Female, 70-79, Retired Clerical Worker) 
England should be governed by the English, basically. We don’t want all this 
interference from Europe. Don’t want it, don’t need it. We’ve been a country 
governing ourselves for so long. We know exactly what we were doing without 
having outside interference. We just don’t need it! The common market has taken 
away our privileges. In one fell swoop. I go to the pensioners club down the road, 
Thursday afternoons. There is one in the community hall every Thursday afternoon 
for pensioners. A few years back we used to get a regular attendance roughly of  
about 65 people. Now we’re lucky if  we’re getting 25 lately. And the majority of  
that is because this mini-bus, they haven’t got drivers, so it’s off  the road. And that 
is very sad. It really is.   
 
What is striking is how June switches, effortlessly, from ‘national politics’ to everyday 
matters – from a self-governing country threatened by interference from Europe, to the 
future of  the local pensioner’s club and community hall. This exemplifies the way everyday 
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matters can resonate with concerns and tensions about national identity. Just as Gullestad 
(1997) discussed in her account of  Norwegian nationalism, people do make connections 
between the national and everyday. It is not wholly evident why June, in the case above, 
makes this specific connection between the national and the local; but one could speculate 
that a perception of  local community decline makes June receptive to political statements 
about the importance of  ‘governing ourselves’. The following illustrates a similar 
connection between everyday concerns about money and receiving a pension and the 
prospect of  joining ‘the Euro’: 
   
` W1: Pete (60-69, Male, Retired Farm Worker) 
Changing the money. That was a complete waste of  time wasn’t it. Now the 
pensioner is having the pension book taken away. You go to the post office and put 
your numbers in the little machine. Well a lot of  these older people they don’t 
understand these machines. It’s gonna take a long time for them to get used to the 
machines. What sense is there in going to the post office with your pension book 
‘bang bang bang’ here’s your money and say thanks very much and come out. 
 
When given the opportunity to elaborate, we find that people’s talk of  the nation consists 
of  a series of  discursive interplays between the national and personal concerns. With June 
and Pete above are concerns with local forms of  sociability, whether this be the pensioner’s 
club or the post office. In a different example, Will illustrates how a relatively banal story 
about health and safety at a building site when on holiday can flow from a statement of  
pride in a nation’s history and achievements, and on to dislike for being over-governed: 
 
W9: Will (Male, 50-59, Engineer) 
I’m very proud of  our history and our social achievements. This country was one 
of  the first to make electric power, sewage, general health, roads, heavy engineering. 
We have quite a strong past. There’s lots there to be proud of. I don’t like the way 
we are going towards a nanny state. I don’t like being over-governed. I think that is 
becoming quite noticeable more and more. Typical example: we came back from 
holiday a couple of  weeks ago and we went to Tenerife and they’re doing a lot of  
building work you walk out on to the road and there’s a building site and they bring 
power to the site. So you’ve got this big mains cable popping up out of  the road 
over the pavement and it’s a building site you and no warnings it’s not covered in 
anyway. We landed back at Bristol airport. We came along to a set of  stairs off  the 
aircraft and there is this beacon repeating danger stairs careful you know. Well that’s 
a bit over the top. We tend to be like that as a country. You’ve got your speed 
cameras. You’ve now got government legislation to stop you smacking your kids. 
15 
 
It’s all a bit silly. This country has been going for a lot longer than 2000 years. Why 
do we suddenly need people telling us what to do to that level? 
 
It is not just that people’s talk of  the nation entails a ‘switching’ between the national and 
the everyday, but that the everyday grounding of  national identity is itself  intimately bound 
up with historical and political themes. In as much as we might wish to emphasise the 
everyday-ness of  national identity, we also have, within the same passages of  talk, 
references to pride in the past and achievements as well as popular ideas of  the age and 
origins of  nations (‘this country has been going for a lot longer than 2000 years’, ‘we were 
fine by ourselves throughout history’). As we illustrate with our final empirical theme 
below, we also find specific phrases, ideas and lines of  argument about the relationship 
between nation and Europe, which were themselves commonplace in political 
commentaries both in the referendum campaign for leaving the EU and in the arguments 
presented by leave voters since. These include the specific phrase of  ‘taking back control’, 
but also wider references to governing or ruling ourselves, as well as to rights and to 
standing alone. Again, it is worth reiterating that these interviews were carried out between 
2004 and 2009. 
 
Political ideas and popular national talk: self-determination and ‘taking back 
control’ 
 
B24: Jack (Male, 25-29, Full time Student) 
We must have a referendum.  I would come out from a personal point of  view. I like 
the Norwegians. I know it’s expensive there but they’ve retained their identity and 
they control their borders. They control their fish and you know. We’ve mortgaged 
it all haven’t we, so I would come out and yes, hold a referendum, and if  it means 
that we stay in, we stay in, so be it, but everybody must act, and as soon as possible, 
not in 5 years time, that’s how we, I see it. 
 
B15: Hannah (Female, 35-39, Unemployed) 
I don’t want to go into Europe. I don’t want to. I want to keep apart from it, I don’t 
think it’ll be good for us, I think it will be definitely the wrong way to go and it will 
end up really bad in the long-term if  we do. Our rights will be taken away from us. 
We will be ruled from Brussels, and they will tell us what we can do and what we 
can’t do and that will be the end of  us. 
 
B5: Mark (Male, 45-49, Sales Manager) 
I think we should stand alone. We should still stick to our certain thing. We’re all 
nationalities you know. We should keep our identities. We need to keep that and not 
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be part of  one big group.  That’s what English is, you still want to be within an 
English group not a European…certainly run from Britain not Europe anyway, not 
from Belgium, you know 
 
B15: Steve (Male, 50-59, Billposter) 
It’s getting worse. We’re not able to actually rule England. We’re becoming a sub-
state of  the EU. They’re actually dictating to us telling us exactly what we can and 
cannot do. I’m British and I’m proud of  it and I want to be British not a sub-state 
of  Europe. 
 
W22: Alan (Male, 70-79, Retired Banker) 
I’m very anti-Europe. I think we’re English and we don’t want to be integrated. We 
don’t want to be ruled from Brussels. I don’t want it. Trade with them? Fine. But no, 
we’re not Europeans in that sense. To think that we could have a governing body 
that could override our Houses of  Parliament. That doesn’t seem right to me. I think 
we should be able to rule ourselves. 
 
W37: Annabel (Female, 50-59, Dental Nurse) 
I think as a whole we would rather be independent of  Europe. In the past we’ve 
stood alone and we like to think we can stand on our own two feet. 
 
Taken together, the extracts above, contain a number of  significant political themes: taking 
control of  immigration and industries; governing ourselves; being ruled from Britain not 
Brussels; having our rights taken away from us; and becoming, increasingly so, a sub-state 
of  Europe rather than a stand-alone nation. The recurrence of  such themes do indicate 
the particular significance of  European integration for political ideas of  England and 
English nationalism (Wellings 2010) and these political concerns do present themselves 
within popular national talk. These political themes intersect with the marking out of  
national boundaries between England/Britain - England and Britain are consistently inter-
changed - and Europe (‘we need to stick to ourselves and not be part of  one big group’ 
we’re English/we’re not Europeans’; ‘I’m British and I’m proud of  it’). Economic and 
political integration with Europe is viewed as rather at odds with respondents’ own ideas 
of  nationhood, and with dire consequences for what it means to be English and/or British. 
 
Discussion: Public attitudes and the 2016 European Union Referendum 
 
We began the paper by considering how a Barthian approach to ethnicity with its emphasis 
on boundaries can be applied to nation and national identity. The empirical analysis then 
tried to show how the boundary concept can be related to popular discourses concerning 
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the relations between England, Britain, Europe and the EU. Clearly, Europe and 
membership of  the EU are important contexts for the drawing of  national boundaries 
and the actions of  some people to preserve these boundaries reveals the significance that 
people vest in national membership. In some instances, national boundaries are deployed 
specifically with regard to a ‘political Englishness’ based on ‘the defending of  British 
sovereignty against European Integration’ (Wellings, 2016: 370) – or, as some of  our 
interviewees would put it, ‘we should rule ourselves rather than be ruled by Brussels’. In 
other cases, boundary drawing is prompted by an immigrant presence (e.g. from Eastern 
Europe) and by a perceived decline in national cultural distinctiveness. The prospect of  
greater European and global integration also prompts popular concerns as to the dilution 
of  national boundaries and the need to reaffirm them. 
 
At the same time, thinking about nation as a boundary marker also involves thinking about 
the boundary concept in ways different to what Barth had originally proposed in relation 
to ethnic groups. For sure, national identities – like other ethnic identities – can be a 
product of  social interaction across boundaries, as Barth conceived. We know from the 
literature on everyday nationhood that peoples sense of  nationhood is reinforced through 
daily social encounters and is framed through people’s material experiences of  the world 
around them: these are the ‘daily social exchanges’ (Gullestad 1997) and the ‘small 
everyday arrangements’ (Edensor 2006). National identity, in everyday settings and talk, 
has mostly been conceptualised as banal and mundane, sometimes indifferent, and the 
somewhat cool national attitudes which are taken to indicate a highly taken for granted 
sense of  national belonging. However, popular, non-elite, talk of  the nation is far from 
trivial and can contain themes with an historical and political meaning. More often than 
not, popular national talk is characterised by an easy interplay between political themes – self-
governing, independence, control over borders; historical ideas – nostalgia about empire, 
industrial prowess or World War Two – and day-to-day concerns – holidays, money, pensions 
or the local club. This, we would suggest, means thinking about nation and boundary as 
produced in the interaction between elites and non-elites which for the most part would 
be communicated through media or institutions, as well as arising from interaction in 
everyday informal settings. 
 
We have argued that there are political themes (‘taking control’, ‘standing alone’, 
‘governing ourselves’) which recur in everyday talk about the nation and which have 
popular appeal, at least in part, because they resonate with everyday concerns. If  this is so, 
then we can also pose the question that knowledge of  these popular attitudes may then 
have been used within the Leave campaign. The victory of  the Leave vote was narrow. 
48.1% of  those who voted favoured ‘Remain’ and Remain lost by only 1,269,501 votes. If  
just over 600,000 Leavers had voted Remain, it would have been a tie. A great deal of  
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effort and debate has gone into trying to explain the result. A few things are clear and 
more or less undisputed. First of  all, young people voted to Remain and this can be taken 
to mean people under 40 years old, not just the youngest. Simon Kuper (2018) has 
calculated that, assuming that age-related attitudes to the EU stay the same, age changes 
(i.e. additions to the  young age group, deaths among the old) would mean that Remain 
would have won in a referendum held in, say, 2020. We also know that it was England 
where Leave won by the largest margin (53.4% Leave) followed by Wales (52.5% Leave); 
in Scotland 62% voted Remain, in Northern Ireland 55.8% voted Remain. Those who 
were not University educated were more likely to vote Leave.  But as Danny Dorling (2016) 
has argued ‘the Leave vote has been unfairly blamed on working class voters in the North 
of  England’. Middle class Leave voters in the south of  England had much more effect on 
the result. 
 
Despite the significant support for Remain, we can begin to see how the Leave campaign 
ended victorious. We know that categories of  people expected to vote Leave were more 
likely to turn out to vote and this may reflect a genuine and strong sense of  commitment 
to Leaving and, by comparison, the weakness of  positive enthusiasm for the EU (as against 
support for broadly cosmopolitan values). The Remain campaign may also have been 
‘swimming against a tide’ as euro-sceptic opinion had been growing over previous decades 
(Swales 2016) and was deeply set within a certain spectrum of  British attitudes. Dominic 
Cummings, the manager of  the official Leave campaign has speculated that three things, 
the 2008 economic crisis, the austerity programme, and the problems of  the euro, also 
counted against the Remain argument (Cummings 2017). If  Cummings (2017), and the 
Shipman (2017) are to be believed, the Leave campaign (meaning the official Leave 
campaign) was better organized and more adept at reaching its public, especially through 
the sophisticated use of  digital methods. The Remain campaign had the misfortune of  
being led by Cameron who was remote, lacked an easy sense of  what people were thinking 
and represented the establishment. Leave voting was, in part, an anti-establishment vote, 
and Cameron looked, and was, establishment. The ‘establishment’ focus on the economic 
risks of  leaving the EU largely failed. Swales (2016) concluded ‘The Leave campaign 
resonated more strongly with the public. There was a greater sense of  certainty about what 
impact leaving the EU would have on immigration and independence. People were less 
persuaded by the Remain campaign’s focus on the economic risks’ (2016: 2). 
 
One strong indication of  the success of  the official Leave campaign in knowing its public, 
was its focus on ‘taking back control’, probably the most telling of  all the slogans deployed 
by any of  the campaigns. The official Leave campaign team knew that this resonated with 
significant sections of  the British public and they knew this through polling data, focus 
groups and their skilful use of  digital resources. This slogan then dovetailed with ‘taking 
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back control of  immigration’ and taking back our money – our weekly contributions to 
the EU, famously displayed on the side of  the campaign bus. Their emphasis on these 
ideas almost certainly fed into a web of  related themes with long-standing influence in 
both elite and popular thinking. 
 
One of  these was the idea that the United Kingdom (or Britain or England) is perfectly 
able to ‘stand alone’ in the world and ‘find its own’ as it has in the past – a ‘popular memory’ 
reference to the Second World War and possibly earlier to industrial and imperial 
leadership. It might be harder to ‘stand-alone’ in the present world but a frank belief  that 
the United Kingdom could not do this was open to being portrayed as ‘unpatriotic’ and 
lacking faith in your own country. Similarly a cosmopolitan pro-European attitude can be 
portrayed as unpatriotic. Consider this from Boris Johnson: 
 
When people say that they feel they have more in common with others in Europe 
than with people who voted leave I want to say, ‘But that is part of  the reason why 
people voted leave.’ You don’t have to be some tub-thumping nationalist to worry 
that a transnational sense of  allegiance can weaken the ties between us; and you 
don’t have to be an out-and-out nationalist to feel an immense pride in this country 
and what it can do (cited in Groves 2017). 
This brings us back to the question of  national identity and to the concerns of  our 
interviewees about a loss of  national distinctiveness, about ‘standardisation’ and a process 
of  ‘flattening out’ of  character and style. These were sometimes linked to the USA and 
Americanisation, or to globalisation, but also to the EU and being governed by Brussels. 
In summary, specific attitudes to the EU were guided by more general, and probably long-
term, postures towards social change. From our interviews we have seen that views of  
Britain-England and the EU are set in a context of  wider social perceptions of  Britain and social 
change. We can detect three principal themes in many of  these perceptions: decline, 
standardisation and control. 
Decline: The ‘resentful nationalist’ interviewees saw Britain as having once been great, 
leading the world in inventions, industry and enterprise, but now marked by de-
industrialisation, social decay and lack of  civility. People refer to the ‘large’ things – the 
loss of  great industries and attendant employment. And just as people connect the national 
question of  the EU to local changes, people also speak of  national decline and local 
decline – the ‘small’ things as well as the large things. People speak of  national decline in the 
same breath of  talking about incivility. As we observed in an earlier paper, ‘One interviewee 
spoke about ‘this country’ by simply telling a story of  discourtesy in an encounter whilst 
shopping. Others spoke of  scruffiness, indiscipline and ill manners. We may interpret this as 
meaning that, when people talk about how they relate to ‘the country’ they actually talk about 
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how they relate to one another’ (Fenton 2008). The EU is one part of  a period where Britain 
is seen to be in decline, beset by political correctness, over-government and social decay. In 
the words of  one of  our interviewees (Will): ‘I’m very proud of  our history and our social 
achievements…I don’t like the way we are going towards a nanny state. I don’t like being 
over-governed’. 
Standardisation: Being ‘over-governed’ meant being subject to many rules and standards. This 
might be imposed by the national government or by supra-state powers including the EU. 
Of course, this antipathy towards ‘regulation’ extends to the theme of  ‘control’ (below). 
Standardisation means loss of  identity both nationally and in local distinctiveness. Some of  
our interviewees mentioned the Euro in this connection; others spoke more generally about 
‘standardisation’, flattening everything out, or internationalisation. Kate above stated this 
quite baldly: ‘we’re flattening everything out. It’s being eroded’. Or as Vicky puts it: 
‘everything’s turning international…being standardised throughout the world’. 
Control: When our interviewees spoke about the European they often spoke disparagingly 
about ‘being controlled from Brussels’. If, people say, Britain has a proud history, has always 
‘stood alone’, and has been a success by its own efforts, then why should Britain cede control 
(of  its affairs, its borders) to the EU, or more generally other powers like the US, or less 
precisely ‘globalisation’? This is the message of  these interviewees, like Jack: ‘We must have 
a referendum. I’d like to be like the Norwegians…they’ve retained their identity and they 
control their borders. They control their fish. We’ve mortgaged it all haven’t we..?’. 
 
Writing in Der Spiegel, Esch et al. (2018) see this sense of  ‘loss of  control’ as being ‘generalised’ 
- i.e. not just a reaction to the EU -  and being at the heart of  the new populist anti-democratic 
sentiments found in Trump’s US and through much of  Europe. 
 
‘Take back control’ was the slogan with which the Brexit campaign won the 
referendum. The feeling of  living in an era of  loss of  control may be the common 
denominator of  all European populists. Taking back control is a promise common 
to them all...This goes together with the wish to throw off  the corset which 
seemingly makes life in the West unfree. All of  the laws, rules, regulations and 
contracts which stipulate to individuals, businesses and whole countries how they 
are to behave. What they are allowed to say and what not. What they may buy and 
what not. How things are to be produced and how not. Out of  this wish to impose 
one’s own simpler rules on the world strike the new autocrats and authoritarian-
minded their spark (2018: 10-18). 
 
These broader, and long-standing, social dispositions about society, government and 
politics – about decline, regulation, control – form a cognitive backdrop to how people 
think about the nation, sovereignty and the EU. And the way people form ideas about the 
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nation which are historical, directly or indirectly political, but also woven into perceptions 
of  everyday life, shows that the nation and its boundaries are important categories for 
individuals. In the absence of  much precise knowledge about the EU  - and people in the 
UK were reported to be the least knowledgeable of  all 28 countries (Hix 2015) - it is this 
sense of  nationhood, and the broad social dispositions associated with it, which are likely 
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